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Abstract 
This paper analyses the Europeanisation of Kosovo by focusing on conditionality and deliberation as 
EU enlargement tools. Despite the high presence of EU institutions in Kosovo, the EU does not 
recognize Kosovo as a country, but offers the possibility of integration as it currently does for all other 
Western Balkan countries. This paper analyses the way in which the EU applies conditionality 
towards Kosovo in the pre-accession period and the extent to which this is combined with deliberation. 
In order to measure conditionality and deliberation, I take as a case study the Stabilization Association 
Process Dialogue Meeting between EU and Kosovo. For conditionality I present my own methodology, 
whereas for deliberation I apply Discourse Quality Index (DQI). I conclude, that EU uses deliberation 
in the process of conditionality, whereas Kosovo representatives use conditionality very rarely.  
Key words: Europeanisation, conditionality, deliberation, Kosovo, SAA 
1. Introduction  
Countries aspiring to join the European Union must undergo a complex process of 
transformation and change designed by the EU in order to ensure that European values 
are accepted and adopted by the candidate country. However, this is not a one-sided 
process: the EU also undergoes change. Research into Europeanisation and its 
processes and effects both on candidate countries and the EU itself has been driven 
mainly by the recognition that EU enlargement has involved large-scale political and 
legal transformation in candidate countries caused by EU conditionality (Zhelyazkova, 
et.al, 2019, 34). 
This paper analyses the Europeanisation of Kosovo by focusing on EU conditionality 
and deliberation as important tools. Kosovo as a new country is faced with many 
processes at the same time: state building, democratization of institutions and society, 
reconciliation with Serbia, international recognition and membership in international 
organizations and integration of minorities. Despite the high presence of EU 
institutions in Kosovo, the EU does not recognize Kosovo as a country due to the fact 
ha  fi e membe  c ie  ill d   ec g i e K  i de e de ce. I  de   
investigate the workings of conditionality and deliberation in the case of Kosovo, I 
analyse the documentation of the High Representative Meeting between EU and 
Kosovo representatives in the Stabilization and Association Process Dialogue: Sectorial 
Meeting on Justice, Freedom and Security, which was held in Prishtina in January 





Stabilization and Association Agreement, which covers fields in which Kosovo faces the 
most challenges. It was a two-day meeting with morning and afternoon sessions. I was 
present in all these meetings and took notes based on my observations of the dialogues. 
I observed tone and manner as well as the body language of the speakers. All in all, I 
coded and evaluated 30 dialogues on specific issues between the two sides. For the 
transcripts I used official government audio. The meeting took place behind closed 
doors, which needs to be considered when interpreting the data, because political 
actors often behave differently in public versus non-public meetings (Steiner et al, 
2005)1.  
The main research question is to what extent the discussions between EU and Kosovo 
representatives were characterized by conditionality and deliberation. For 
conditionality I have developed my own index, and for deliberation I use the Discourse 
Quality Index (DQI) developed by Jürg Steiner and his research team (Steiner et al. 
2012).  
2. Theoretical Framework 
2.1 Europeanisation and Conditionality  
E ea i a i  i  m  f e  a cia ed i h d me ic ada a i   he e e  
ema a i g di ec l   i di ec l  f m EU membe hi  (Fea he e /Radaelli, 2003, 
7). I  i  al  ee  a  a ce  ha  i l e  he e e a i  f a i al a d b-
national systems of governance by a European Political Centre and European-wide 
norms (Olsen, 2001, 3). Per definitionem E ea i a i  gge  a -d  
diffusion of common political rules, norms and practices, but there are significant 
differences of opinion as to the substantive content of the concept and whether it has 
meaningful effects within national political systems. 
The literature on Europea i a i  ide ifie  c di i ali  a  he EU  m  e f l 
instrument of change (Grabbe, 2003, 316). EU policy towards candidate countries is 
generally described as predominantly a policy of conditionality. It is conceptualized as 
a ba gai i g a eg  f ei f ceme  b  e a d , i  hich he e f h ea  a d 
promises influences the likelihood of compliance with the imposed criteria 
(Schimmelfennig/Sedelmeier, 2004, 64). Conditionality thus acts as a gate-keeping 
mechanism, as the EU bases access to the upper stages of the association and 
integration process on satisfactory performance (Heather, 2002, 57). The Union 
controls this process by means of 1) access to negotiations, 2) the provision of 
legislative and institutional templates, 3) aid and technical assistance, 4) policy advice, 
and 5) monitoring (Grabbe, 2002, 57). 
In the Western Balkans, EU conditionality is not just an enlargement tool, it is a 
political multi-dimensional and multi-purpose instrument of EU Foreign and Security 
Policy, geared to establish reconstruction, reconciliation and reform in the respective 
countries. In previous years, the EU had no common strategy defined with visible 
benefits from the EU integration process for the Western Balkans. In this 
uncoordinated situation, the Western Balkan countries experienced difficulties in 
implementing substantial democratic reforms. Deeply divided societies, political 
fragility and damaged and broken inter-state relations characterize the Western 
 
1 For more detailed results on this study see my book: Lushaku Sadriu, Jehona. Europeanization through 
conditionality and deliberation. An analysis of the case of Kosovo. LIT Verlag, Münster, 2019 
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Balkan countries. Therefore, conditionality as a tool to achieve Europeanisation cannot 
be used alone- it needs to be combined with a lot of deliberation.  
2.2 Europeanisation and Deliberation   
Deliberation can be regarded as a process in which different relevant reasons and 
opinions with regard to political issues are discussed and evaluated. Deliberation is a 
public political procedure associated with well-functioning democratic practices 
(Weale, 2007, 84). Deliberation means unconstrained participation of all stakeholders, 
justification of arguments with good reasons, references to the common good, respect 
for arguments of others, truthfulness, and the willingness to yield to the force of the 
better argument. This leads to a democratic system, in which the process of 
deliberation is embedded within the system and gives more legitimacy to political 
outcomes (Mansbridge, 2007, 251). Deliberation contrasts with politics only driven by 
power and self-interest. In a political culture of deliberation, there should be less 
polarization, making it easier to resolve political problems. Therefore, it is important 
that actors are willing to be fallible, revising their positions, if new information turns 
up. In this way, deliberation has a long-term perspective in the sense that political 
decisions are not one-time shots but are extended over time. In a deliberative political 
system, power and self-interest are still present, but they are not the exclusive forces 
driving politics (Guttmann and Thompson, 2004, 6). 
Acc di g  Habe ma  he  f c mm ica i , the proper application of 
deliberation is not only a desirable function for a democracy, but a vital one. This is 
because deliberation generates not only a decision, but also a legitimation of the 
decision through the negotiation process. For Habermas it is particularly important 
that ordinary citizens are involved in the political process. They do not only participate 
in elections but are also involved in discussing everyday political issues. Habermas 
foresees a two-phase process. First, ordinary citizens discuss political issues among 
themselves and transmit their positions to political leaders, who then discuss the issues 
further and make the formal decisions. In this way, deliberative democracy is much 
more participatory than a political system based on elections (Habermas, 1984).  
In reality, deliberation will never appear in such an idealised form. Often, political 
actors formulate conditions that they absolutely want to be fulfilled. They insist on 
their own preferences and do not care about the preferences of others. In real political 
life, deliberation and conditionality may often be mixed within the same meeting and 
sometimes even within the same speech. In this paper, I investigate this complexity 
between deliberation and conditionality in one particular meeting between 
representatives of Kosovo and the European Union.    
3. Political Engagement of the EU in Kosovo  
Kosovo declared its independence on February 17, 2008 and committed to fulfilling its 
obligations foreseen in the Ahtisaari Plan to build a democratic country with good 
governance based on multi-ethnicity, during a period of international supervision. 
From the declaration of its independence, over 110 countries have recognized Kosovo, 
including 23 of the 28 member countries of the EU, and all the neighbouring countries 






3.1 EU and Kosovo Relations 
At the EU Summit in Cologne (1999), the EU took some important decisions for the 
Europeanisation of its Foreign and Security Policy. These included the establishment 
of the Stability Pact, under which the countries of Ex-Yugoslavia, including Kosovo, 
would profit (Lemke, 2018, 98) from an agenda for further integration and future 
membership in the EU. 
Another significant step for the Western Balkan countries was the European Council 
Summit in Thessaloniki in 2003, where the determination to support the perspective 
of the Western Balkan countries was confirmed. The agenda adopted at that summit, 
The Thessaloniki Agenda for the Western Balkans, aimed at further strengthening the 
i ileged ela i  be ee  he EU a d he We e  Balka . Thi  c fi med he EU  
accession perspective for the countries of the region in very clear language that the 
future of the Balkans is within the European Union2. Kosovo was included among the 
other Western Balkan countries in this common future integration process; even 
though the final status of Kosovo was not defined.  
Kosovo was administered at that time by the United Nations Mission (UNMIK), whose 
mandate was defined under Resolution 1244 3 . This resolution authorized the 
deployment of an international civilian and military presence that has provided an 
international transitional administration and security presence that oversaw the 
return of refugees and the withdrawal of military forces from Kosovo. By this 
Resolution was foreseen that an international civilian presence would facilitate a 
political process to determine the future status of Kosovo 4 . Between 1999-2008 
UNMIK was administrating Kosovo, meanwhile a legal base was created for K  
institutions to gradually receive more competences for self-administration. The EU 
was part of UNMIK-third pillar, responsible for economic development and 
reconstruction.  
D i g he f ll i g ea , he EU  a ach  K , a  i h all We ern Balkan 
countries, occurred in the framework of European Partnerships, which are supporting 
instruments aiming to identify short- to mid-term priorities for reforms and help the 
countries on the European integration path5. In Kosovo, this partnership aimed to 
support to strengthen democracy and the rule of law, to contribute to political and 
institutional stability, and to support the efforts of Kosovo to develop its economic and 
international cooperation and the approximation of its legislation to that of the EU.  
Be ee  2005 a d 2008, h ee Ac i  Pla  f  he im leme a i  f he E ea  
partnership have been implemented as a guide for improvements to Kosovo 
institutions. These partnership agreements confirmed the commitment of the EU 
towards Kosovo and helped to identify the financial needs based on the priorities 
confirmed by the Kosovo government.  
 
2 Council of European Union: The Thessaloniki Agenda for the Western Balkans. h ://e a.e   a id  e -
release_PRES-03-163_en (accessed 10 June 2019). 
3  Resolution 1244 (1999) / adopted by the Security Council at its 4011th meeting, on 10 June 1999, 
https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/274488 (accessed 10 June 2019). 
4  Resolution 1244 (1999) / adopted by the Security Council at its 4011th meeting, on 10 June 1999, 
https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/274488 (accessed 10 June 2019). 
5 European Partnerships came out in the Thessaloniki Agenda in 2001. 
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In 2008, the EU adopted another partnership with both Serbia and Kosovo, aiming to 
offer a supporting framework to prepare them for further integration into the 
European Union. The main objective of this partnership framework was to define 
priority areas for reform and implementation of appropriate legislation; development 
of plan for financial assistance for action in these priority areas and the definition of 
principles and conditions governing implementation of the partnership. This 
partnership aimed to be implemented through the Stabilization and Association 
process, which represents the EU's policy towards the Western Balkans with the aim 
of eventual EU membership.  
After independence, the relations between the EU and Kosovo were very intensive and 
advanced to a higher level. After its Declaration of Independence, Kosovo invited an 
EU mission (EULEX) to be deployed for supporting the rule of law in the country.  
3.2 The European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) 
The European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX)  e all mi i  a   
assist the Kosovo authorities in establishing sustainable and independent rule of law 
institutions through monitoring and operation pillars. Furthermore, the EULEX 
mandate was to assist the Kosovo institutions, judicial authorities and law enforcement 
agencies in their progress towards sustainability and accountability. Part of this 
mandate was to develop and strengthen an independent multi-ethnic justice system 
and multi-ethnic police and customs service, ensuring that these institutions are free 
from political interference and adhere to internationally recognized standards and 
European best practices. A e  mi i  ma da e ha  bee  la ched to 14 June 2020 
based on Council Decision CFSP 2018/856, whereas EULEX still works within the 
framework of UN Security Council Resolution 1244, under which the status of Kosovo 
is not defined.   
3.3 Visa Liberalization Process 
As in all other Western Balkan countries, the European Commission started the 
Kosovo visa liberalization process in 2012. The Commission presented Kosovo with a 
roadmap for such liberalization, which identified the legislation and institutional 
measures that Kosovo needed to adopt and implement to advance towards visa 
liberalization. The roadmap foresees a comprehensive list of reforms, including 
document security, border boundaries, migration management, asylum, the fight 
against organized crime and corruption and fundamental rights related to the freedom 
of movement. Kosovo was evaluated by the EU Commission four times between 2012 
ill 2016 i  e a a e e , hich c ai ed a  a e me  f K  g e  i  
fulfilling the 95 benchmarks of the visa roadmap, recommendations addressed to 
Kosovo, and an assessment of the potential migratory and security impacts of visa 
liberalization. In the latest report published in 2016, the EU concluded that only two 
criteria remained unfulfilled: ratification of the border demarcation agreement with 
Montenegro and strengthening of the fight against organized crime and corruption. In 
2018, the European Commission concluded that the remaining two criteria had been 
fulfilled and recommended to the EU Parliament and the Council of EU to start the 
procedure for making a positive decision regarding a visa free regime for Kosovo. The 
European Parliament voted in favour of the mandate for negotiations, but the EU 





agenda of the Council of EU. Thus, Kosovo remains the last Western Balkan country 
unable to participate in the Schengen visa free regime.  
3.4 Stabilization and Association Process (SAP)  
The most significant step in Ko  a h a d  EU membe hi  a  he 
Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) signed on 1 April 2016 in Strasbourg 
between the EU and Kosovo. This agreement is the first contractual agreement 
between Kosovo and the EU and has a significant political, economic and legal impact. 
The SAA Agreement will be implemented mainly by the public institutions of Kosovo 
and has an impact in different fields from strengthening democracy and the rule of law, 
to contributing to political, economic and institutional stability, providing an 
appropriate framework for political dialogue, to developing and strengthening the 
economic and international cooperation, and to approximation of the legislation to 
that of the EU; to gradually developing a free trade area between the EU and Kosovo; 
etc. There will be regular negotiations between representatives of the EU and Kosovo 
on achieving the goals as set out in SAA Agreement. These negotiations will be 
structured and divided into sectorial dialogues in different fields called Stabilization 
and Association Partnership Dialogue Meetings (SAPD).  
The SAP Dialogues are the basic framework of technical and political discussions 
between Kosovo high representatives and EU delegations on the achievements 
regarding the European Agenda. In these meetings the EU receives reports on the 
implementation of reforms and fulfilment of criteria stipulated by the European 
Partnership.  
The main sectorial meeting areas that the SAP Dialogues focused on were Justice, 
Freedom and Security; Innovation, Information Society, Social Policy, Education and 
Culture; Trade, Industry, Customs and Taxation; Internal Market, Competition, 
Consumer and Health Protection; Agriculture, Fisheries, Forestry, Food Safety; 
Transport, Environment, Energy, Regional Development; Economic and Financial 
Issues, Statistics.  
3.5 European Union as Donor in Kosovo 
After the war in 1999 in Kosovo, the EU provided the largest amount of funding for 
reconstruction, giving 275 million Euros in the year 20006. Together with the World 
Bank, the EU designed a reconstruction and recovery program for Kosovo, which 
outlined the recovery strategy, set overall goals and priorities, and provided an 
estimate of external funding requirements for economic development, improvements 
in infrastructure and public administration.  
4. Measuring the Level of Conditionality and Deliberation 
Over the past decades, the European Union has applied conditionality towards 
countries in the process of enlargement to encourage their adoption and 
institutionalization of European values and standards. In the Western Balkans, EU 
conditionality has been used to consolidate peace, encourage multi-ethnicity, improve 
relations between countries, and stabilize economies. This aspect of conditionality has 
 
6 Kosovo one year on the European Contribution: Available at: https://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-
00-12_en.htm  
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been widely researched by different authors, but not in relation to deliberation. 
Therefore, in this paper I introduce a new field to this research: the interplay between 
conditionality and deliberation, which I will examine by analysing the dialogues 
between representatives of the EU and Kosovo.  
4.1 Measuring Conditionality 
For the level of conditionality, I use three codes: 
No conditionality 
In such dialogues, neither side puts a condition to the other. There are no threats of 
sanctions or promises of rewards.  
Implicit conditionality 
One or both sides express dissatisfaction, but no threats of sanctions or promises of 
rewards are expressed. Such threats and promises, however, exist implicitly in the 
background.  
Explicit conditionality 
One or both sides put conditions to the other side and attempt to get their way with the 
threat of sanctions and/or the promise of rewards.  
4.2 Measuring Deliberation 
To measure the level of deliberation in the individual dialogues, I use the well-
established Discourse Quality Index (DQI) developed by the research team of Jürg 
Steiner (Steiner et al., 2005). This index shows high scores when: 
x there are no constrains on any participant to speak freely 
x arguments are justified with reasons 
x arguments are justified in terms of the common good 
x arguments of others are treated with respect 
x participants are willing to yield to the force of the better argument 
4.3 Coding of the Sectorial Meeting in the Process of Stabilization 
Association Process Dialogue (SAPD) 
Sectorial Meetings in the process of SAPD are the main meetings that cover a whole 
sector, such as Justice, Freedom and Security; Innovation, Information Society, etc. 
and are co-chaired by representatives from the European Commission and the country 
government, in this case Kosovo. In these meetings, representatives of EU Commission 
and EU Delegation meet with all respective representatives from country institutions 
and report on/discuss different issues. The main aim of these meetings is to check the 
progress made by country institutions as recommended by the annual country report, 
published by European Commission. EU Representatives asked the representatives of 
Kosovo about different issues and they have to report and give explanations. Each 
meeting results in jointly agreed follow-up actions to be taken by the Kosovo 
authorities. The conclusions from the meetings are posted on the website of the EU 





One such sectorial meeting of the SAPD is the basis of this study, which has an overall 
focus on Justice, Freedom and Security; it consisted of six sections focused on: Home 
affairs and the fight against organized crime; the fight against corruption; human 
rights and fundamental freedoms; respect and protection of minority communities; 
protection of cultural heritage; and the judiciary.  
Thirty dialogues between EU representatives and representatives of Kosovo 
institutions in this meeting were coded according to conditionality and deliberation, 
using the categories presented above.  
5. Analysis of the Thirty Dialogues  
I will present the first of the thirty Dialogues in some detail to provide an overview into 
my research procedure and clarify how I combine qualitative and quantitative 
methods. To keep the confidentiality of the participants7, I do not give their real names. 
The meeting begins with an interchange between EU representative EU1, who is the 
chair, and KS1 of the Election Commission of Kosovo. EU1 begins the discussion in a 
respec f l a , elli g KS1 ha  i  i  e  ice mee i g .  EU1 he  ie   ake 
e e f KS1, ack ledgi g ha  he ma   be able  gi e a e   all f he 
e i  f m he EU1 ide. EU1 he  f m la e  he  fi  e i  i  a -
threatening, e al  a , a ki g KS1 he he  he elec al ef m i  eeded, a d 
h  i  h ld be d e.  The e a e  eleme  f c di i ali  i  hi  e i g eech, 
in the sense that EU1 does not state that election reform is a precondition for positive 
measu e  f he EU. EU1  i i  i ead fi d  a e al a   a k KS1 h  hi g  
stand in Kosovo with regard to the election reform.   
KS1  a e  emai  a  a  i f ma i al le el. She i f m  EU1 ha  he Elec i  
C mmi i  i   he i i i , h  ca  i i ia e elec al ef m,  b  ca  l  
i f m e e b d  [a d] gi e ec mme da i   he ef m . I  i  he a liame , 
 he e e e a i e  f he a ie  h  ca  a  hi  li ical ef m.  KS1 c i e , 
stating that she can give advice on technical matters of an election reform, but cannot 
say whether the reform itself is needed. The discussion continues at a deliberative level 
with KS1 staying on topic and answering the question of EU1.  
EU1 does not complain that KS1 did not answer her question in a satisfactory way. 
Instead, EU1 politely encourages KS1 to outline the technical recommendations that 
she had mentioned [to whom?] with regard to the election reform.  
KS1 is evasive and unclear in her answer. She responds:  
me mall cha ge   technical changes  as I said, and now I cannot give the 
details because it is impossible to give recommendations in detail, but some 
technical issues, some technical operations need to be changed to have better 
elec i .  
KS1 tries to downplay the importance of these technical details, but then still argues 
that a change in these technical details is important for better election Finally, she 
a e  ha  he elec al em i  me hi g ha  e a e  deali g i h i   
i i i .  She c adic  her earlier statement that the Election Commission can 
 
7 The eal ame  f m EU e e e a i e  ha e bee  c ded a  EU1, EU2, EU3  a d he e e e a i e  f K  
a  KS1, KS2, KS3  
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give advice on technical matters and appears unwilling to give any technical details on 
the election system. With this evasive and unclear statement, KS1 lowers the level of 
deliberation, and the discussion reaches an impasse. KS1 seems to have something that 
she does not wish to reveal.  
EU1 eac  i  a delibe a i e a , b   c m lai i g ab  KS1  ef al  a e  he 
question asked of her. EU1 continues to show respect for KS1. There are also no signs 
of conditionality, since EU1 does not threaten that an answer to her question would be 
precondition for further progress in negotiations. Instead, she turns to the question of 
e  li  a d a k  ha  le he Elec i  C mmi i  ha  i  e abli hi g these lists.  
This time, KS1 gives a lengthy and clear answer, explaining that it is not up to the 
Elec i  C mmi i   e abli h he e  li . A  he e lai : 
I  fac , a  i  i  , e a e j  ecei i g he li  f m he Ci il Registration 
Agency or from the Ministry of the Interior. So, we are not creating the voters  
list, it is created by the Agency. The second day after the election is announced, 
we are just receiving the lists from the Agency for Civil Registration, and 
basically, we cannot change the lists except with a judicial order. We cannot 
em e  add a b d  e ce  if e ha e a j dicial de , a d if e d  ha e 
i , e ca  cha ge a hi g.   
KS1  e la a i  he e i cl de  he i a ce  he  he Elec i  C mmission is 
all ed  cha ge he e  li , hich i  e  delibe a i e f m a  i f ma i al 
perspective. From the context, it was easier this time for KS1 to give a straightforward 
answer because, contrary to the previous question posed by EU1, she did not have to 
hide recommendations that she did not wish to reveal.  
EU1 acknowledges that: 
Pe ha  me f  e i  g  be d  c m e e ce, b  e j  ai e 
them because of the records and because these are the questions we have. You 
could always ge  back   i h i e  a e  a d le   k .   
Here again, there are no elements of conditionality, EU1 rather shows understanding 
in a deliberative way that KS1 did not answer all the questions satisfactorily. Having 
assured KS1, EU1 continues with two more questions. First, he wonders whether the 
e  li  h ld be e i ed to become more accurate. Second, he asks whether the 
audits of the finances of the political parties have been properly done. KS1 does not 
answer the first question and for he ec d e i , he a e  ha  he Elec i  
Commission is not responsible to do the audit of the finances of the political parties. 
Thi  i  d e b  he Pa liame  a d e ha e hi g  d  i h ha .  
What does this interchange between EU1 and KS1 tell us about conditionality and 
deliberation in the context of formal EU-Kosovo relations in the pre-accession period? 
To what extent was this dialogue characterized by deliberation versus conditionality? 
Were the two forms of interaction more often used by the EU or the Kosovo sides? 
Firstly, in this dialogue there were no signs of conditionality. When KS1 was evasive 
about a question or did not answer at all, not once did EU1 threaten that unsatisfactory 
answers could endanger any EU programs. On the contrary, he was always polite, 
smiling from time to time, and nodding his head in a supportive manner. His questions 





highly deliberative performance on the part of EU1. KS1, by contrast, was defensive 
and often worried that she was saying something wrong. She appeared to feel inferior 
to EU1, often speaking without clarity. However, she never used inappropriate 
la g age. A  a e l , I d a g e ha  he  beha i ur represented a middle level of 
deliberation.  
With regard to conditionality, we had the following three codes to choose from: no 
conditionality, implicit conditionality and explicit conditionality. 
There was no situation in this particular dialogue between EU1 and KS1, where one of 
the two actors would have insisted that a particular condition had to be fulfilled by the 
other side to get some rewards or to avoid some punishment. Such conditionality was 
not expressed explicitly and not even implicitly.   
With regard to deliberation, both EU1 and KS1 were judged according to the Discourse 
Quality Index (DQI). Neither actor interrupted the other in an undue way. 
Furthermore, both used respectful language and listened to each other attentively. KS1, 
however, due to some of her confusion, disrupted at some point the flow of discussion. 
Using the three categories below, EU1 was coded as good deliberation and KS1 as some 
deliberation among these three categories:  
x no deliberation 
x some deliberation 
x good deliberation 
Having presented the analysis of the first dialogue in some detail as a case study, I can 
now present the overall results for all 30 dialogues. With regards to conditionality, the 
results are as follows: 
Conditionality expressed by the EU side: 
x no conditionality:  in 5 dialogues 
x implicit conditionality:  in 21 dialogues 
x explicit conditionality:  in 4 dialogues 
Conditionality expressed by the Kosovo side: 
x no conditionality: 29 dialogues 
x implicit conditionality:  0 dialogue 
x explicit conditionality:  1 dialogue 
Comparing conditionality expressed by both sides, it is clear that the EU 
representatives held the position of power. Nevertheless, it should still be noted that 
there was one dialogue where conditionality came from the Kosovo side, and this even 
in an explicit way. KS1 argued that many of the conditions that EU1 mentioned to her 
institutions were not fitting under her institution competence, therefore were not 
relevant. KS1 asked the representatives of the EU to remove these conditions, because 
of the relevance. This is noteworthy, although it was the exception to the expectations 
of the EU representatives.  
The EU  ac i  i  he e eg ia i  gge  a fi m, b  -aggressive stance. In 25 
of the 30 dialogues, the EU representative stipulated clearly what actions were 
expected of Kosovo. However, in almost all these cases, conditionality was expressed 
Lushaku, ANZJES 11(2) 
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in an implicit way, which meant that conditionality could be seen only from the context 
in which it was expressed.   
Regarding deliberation, the results are as follows:  
Deliberation by the EU side 
x no deliberation:  no dialogue 
x some deliberation: no dialogue 
x good deliberation:  30 dialogues 
Deliberation by the Kosovo side 
x no deliberation:  no dialogue 
x some deliberation:  1 dialogue 
x good deliberation:  29 dialogues 
In 29 of the 30 dialogues, each side achieved a level of good deliberation. The only 
e ce i  cc ed i  he fi  dial g e, he e KS1 a  a a ded a le el f me 
delibe a i , a  e ha e ee  ab e, he  e covered the first dialogue in some detail. 
There we have shown that KS1 was reluctant to answer a question with regard to the 
election system, which led to some disruption in the flow of the discussion. Such 
disruptions did not occur in any of the other 29 dialogues.  
O e im a  e  add: he  a  ac  beha i u  i  c ded a  g d delibe a i ,  
this does not mean that the behaviou  c e ded  ideal  delibe a i . Ra he , i  
means the behaviou  a  g d e gh  f m a delibe a i e e ec i e in the sense 
that discussion could flow dynamically. As outlined in section 2, deliberation in its 
ideal form hardly ever occurs. Accordingly, it makes sense to identify g d 
delibe a i  he e a  a i a i  i  which representatives of both sides listened to the 
each other respectfully and without interruption.  
6. Conclusion  
The EU  e-accession mechanisms can play a substantive role in the Europeanisation 
process of Kosovo by transferring European values and experiences to newly 
established Kosovar institutions. My research shows that over the course of an official 
two-day dialogue, EU representatives used conditionality in a moderate way embedded 
in a general atmosphere of good deliberation. Kosovo representatives also adhered to 
key deliberative criteria and, in at least one case, formulated their own conditionality. 
These results augur well for a positive ongoing process of Europeanisation in Kosovo. 
The caveat is, however, that the meetings took place behind closed doors, where it is 
usually easier to downplay conditionality and to upgrade deliberation (Steiner et al., 
2005). The challenge for the future is to apply the moderate behaviour that I have 
observed in the closed-door meetings also when the representatives from both sides 
speak up in the public eye.   
Bibliography 
C he , J. Deliberative Democracy in S. W. Rosenberg (Ed.) , Deliberation, 
Participation and Democracy: Can the People govern? New York, Palgrave 





Grabbe, Heather. How does Europeanisation affect CEE governance? Conditionality, 
diff i  a d di e i , Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 8, nr. 4, (2001): 
1013-1031. 
Grabbe, Heather. Eu's Transformative Power. Palgrave Macmillan, 2015. 
Gutmann, Amy; Thompson, Dennis. Why deliberative democracy?  Princeton 
University Press, 2004. 
Habermas, Jürgen, Rehg, W. Constitutional Democracy: A Paradoxical Union of 
Contradictory Principles?  Political Theory Vol. 29, 6, (2009), pp.766-781. 
Habermas, Jürgen. The Theory of Communicative Action, Volumes 1 and 2. Boston: 
Beacon Press, (1989).  
Judah, T. The Kosovo liberation army. Journal of International Affairs, Perceptions, 
(2000) Vol. 20, 61-77. 
Kohler-Koch, B. and Eising, R. The Transformation of Governance in the European 
Union, London: Routledge, 1999. 
Lemke, Christiane, Internationale Beziehungen. Grundkonzepte, Theorien und 
Problemfelder. Berlin/Boston: Walter de Gruyter, 2018. 
Lushaku Sadriu, Jehona, Europeanisation through conditionality and deliberation. 
An analysis of the case of Kosovo, LIT Verlag, Munster, 2019. 
Mansbridge, J. Deliberative Democracy or Democratic Deliberation? In S. W. 
Rosenberg (Ed.), Deliberation, Participation and Democracy: Can the People 
govern? New York: Palgrave MacMillan, (2007), pp.251 - 271.  
Olsen, J. P.'The Many Faces of Europeanisation', ARENA Working Papers WP 02/2 
(2001), p.24.  
Schimmelfennig, F. The EU, NATO and the Integration of Europe. Rules and 
Rhetoric, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Schimmelfennig, F. and 
Sedelmeier, U. (eds) (forthcoming) The Europeanisation of Central and Eastern 
Europe, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, (2003). 
Schimmelfennig, F. and Sedelmeier, U. (eds) The Europeanisation of Central and 
Eastern Europe, Ithaka: Cornell University Press, (2005). 
Schimmelfennig, F., Engert, S., & Knobel, H. Costs, Commitment and Compliance: 
The Impact of EU Democratic Conditionality on Latvia, Slovakia and Turkey. 
JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, (2003), pp. 41(3) 
Schimmelfennig, F., & Sedelmeier, U. (Eds.). The Europeanisation of central and 
Eastern Europe. Cornell University Press, 2005.  
Steiner, J., The Foundations of Deliberative Democracy. Empirical Research and 
Normative Implications. Cambridge University Press. 2012.  
Lushaku, ANZJES 11(2) 
 
44 
Steiner, J., Learning to Deliberate. In Gemma, G. & Harris, C. Citizens  Voices. 
Dublin: Irish Center for Gerontology, 2012. 
Steiner, J., Maria Clara Jaramillo, Rousiley C.M. Maia and Simona Mameli. 
Deliberation across Deeply Divided Societies, Transformative Moments, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, (2017), pp. 1-21.  
Steiner, J., Bächtiger, A., Spörndli, M., & Steenbergen, M. R. Deliberative politics in 
action: Analyzing parliamentary discourse. Cambridge University Press. 2004.  
Steenbergen, M. R., Bächtiger, A., Spörndli, M., & Steiner, J. Measuring political 
deliberation: A discourse quality index. Comparative European Politics, 1(1), (2003). 
pp. 21-48. 
Steiner, J. Concept stretching: The case of deliberation. European Political 
Science, 7(2), (2008). pp. 186-190. 
Steiner, J., & Mameli, S. Deliberation across deeply divided societies. Cambridge 
University Press. 2017.  
Weale, A. Democracy. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.  
Zhelyazkova, A., Damjanovski, I., Nechev, Z., & Schimmelfennig, F. European Union 
Conditionality in the Western Balkans: External Incentives and Europeanisation. In 
The Europeanisation of the Western Balkans, Palgrave Macmillan, (2019). p. 15-37.  
 
 
